The pharmaceutical industry plays an increasingly dominant role in healthcare, raising concerns about Bconflicts of interest^(COI) on the part of the medical professionals who interact with the industry. However, there is considerable disagreement over the extent to which COI is a problem and how it should be managed. Participants in debates about COI have become entrenched in their views, which is both unproductive and deeply confusing for the majority of medical professionals trying to work in an increasingly commercialized environment. We used a modified metanarrative review method to analyse debates about COI in the academic and grey literature. We found two Discourse Models: The Critical Discourse Model sees COI in health and biomedicine as a major problem that both can and should be addressed, while the Defensive Discourse Model argues that current efforts to control COIs are at best unnecessary and at worst harmful. Each model is underpinned by profoundly differing views about how society should be organized-in particular whether market forces should be encouraged or curtailed-and how the dangers associated with market forces should be managed. In order to make any headway, academics and policymakers must recognize that these debates are underpinned by profoundly differing worldviews.
Introduction

Conflict of Interest in Health and Medicine
The pharmaceutical industry plays an increasingly dominant role in healthcare. In addition to developing and manufacturing their own medicines, pharmaceutical companies enter into research partnerships with academic basic scientists; sponsor the majority of clinical trials conducted in academic medical centres; sponsor scientific and medical conferences and other forms of continuing medical education; and employ medical professionals as consultants or Bkey opinion leaders ( Tierney, Meslin, and Kroenke 2016; Ciociola et al. 2014; Rothman et al. 2013; Rothman et al. 2011; Goldman, Compton, and Mittleman 2013; Jakobsen, Wang, and Nwaka 2011) . These activities create many and varied relationships between pharmaceutical companies and healthcare practitioners and medical researchers (henceforth medical professionals).
While relationships between industry and medical professionals can be beneficial to both industry and medicine, one concern about such relationships is that they create Bconflicts of interest^-a phrase that is generally taken in the biomedical context to refer to situations in which medical professionals are less willing and/or able to fulfil their Bprimary commitments^to patients, research participants, or the general public because they have a sense of loyalty to pharmaceutical companies and/or a desire to benefit personally from their interactions with these companies (Lo and Field 2009) .
Concerns about conflict of interest (COI) have led to widespread calls for their management. Some argue for proscribing certain activities that could lead to COIs. For example, there are increasingly stringent rules about gift-giving to doctors (Washington 2012) , and medical professionals with industry ties are often excluded from authorship of review articles and membership of committees making decisions about the regulation, funding, or inclusion in clinical practice guidelines of new health technologies (Steinbrook, Kassirer, and Angell 2015; Cosgrove et al. 2014; Pham-Kanter 2014) . Others believe the focus should be more on transparency, as evident, for example, in the recent enactment of BSunshine^legislation as part of the United States Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) (DeMartino 2012).
Debates About Conflict of Interest: A Discourse At An Impasse
Not everyone agrees, however, that COI is a major problem that needs to be managed in these ways. In recent years, an increasingly vocal counter-discourse has emerged that challenges the so-called BCOI movement^and its demands for disclosure and control of interactions between medical professionals and health-related industries (Barton, Stossel, and Stell 2014; Shaywitz and Stossel 2009; Stossel and Stell 2011; Stell 2010) . Two particularly vocal critics, David Barton and Thomas Stossel, for example, have argued that:
[A]fter more than 20 years, the conflict of interest (COI) movement has failed to substantiate its central claim that interactions between physicians, researchers and the medical products industry cause physicians to make clinical decisions that are adverse to the best interests of their patients … At the same time, they have diverted resources away from more worthwhile pursuits, such as basic and applied medical research, clinical care and medical education towards onerous compliance exercises and obtrusive laws. (Barton, Stossel, and Stell 2014, 666) While disagreement about an issue as complex as COI in health and medicine is to be expected, even a cursory examination of the current discourse shows that debates about COI have become characterized by both a high degree of entrenchment in either critical or defensive positions, as well as a dismissive attitude towards those who have opposing views. For example, medical professionals who want to interact with industry are accused of being Bcorrupt^or Bfor sale^ (Angell 2009; Rodwin 2012) , while those with concerns about COI are described as being members of an Bideological^movement or as Bpharmascoldsê ngaging in Bcharacter assassination^of those with COIs (Barton, Stossel, and Stell 2014; Shaywitz and Stossel 2009; Stell 2010) .
Furthermore, debates about COIs and how they should be managed have become repetitive-to the point of ossification. Biomedical and health journals have become saturated with articles that Bdiscovern ew COIs, seek to identify the responsible part(ies), and advance their proposed remedy (e.g. a greater transparency or a formal policy change). This is increasingly commonly followed by a counter-discourse, defending the actions of industry collaborators and arguing against excessively heavy-handed responses (Barton, Stossel, and Stell 2014; Kingdom 2013; Citrome et al. 2014) . The debates then tend to stall without compromise or resolution.
This situation is not only unproductive but also likely to be deeply confusing for the vast majority of medical professionals who are simply trying to get their work done in environments in which public resources are scarce and industry relationships are increasingly necessary and expected (Jakobsen, Wang, and Nwaka 2011; Goldman, Compton, and Mittleman 2013; Tierney, Meslin, and Kroenke 2016; Ciociola et al. 2014; Rothman et al. 2013; Rothman et al. 2011) .
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the current state of the COI discourse, in order to identify areas of similarity and difference between those with opposing views. In so-doing, we hope to offer both academics and policymakers a deeper understanding of why people might hold opposing views and why they might resist efforts to manage (or not manage) COIs in particular ways.
The Need For An Analysis of the COI BFocused DiscourseP olitical scientists have long argued that hotly contested debates can be better understood by thoroughly analysing the social locations and belief systems of people with opposing views and looking for areas of similarity and difference that are not immediately evident in more superficial analyses. There are numerous ways of doing this. One approach is to study BFocused Discourses^ (Gee 1999; Little and Lipworth 2007) . Focused Discourses are means of communicating the values and ideologies of a group of people with common interests through patterned use of symbols, including language. They exist at the Bmeso^level of analysis between everyday language (small d-discourse) on the one hand and large scale meta-narratives on the other. They Bcondense^around specific issues and are therefore suited to the analysis of debates such as the one surrounding Bconflict of interest.F ocused Discourses are constructed and reconstructed in the context of Discourse communities. Membership of these communities serves a number of purposes. As individuals, alignment with Discourse communities helps to understand how the world works and links us to others with similar views. Politically, Discourse communities validate social groupings and get people and things recognized in certain ways and not others. They therefore play a major role in shaping debates (or big CConversations) about key political issues and in moulding policy and practice.
Focused Discourses achieve their political goals in part by creating (and reinforcing) particular BDiscourse models.^These are master storylines that provide resources and sources of reference to which members of a Discourse community turn when faced with uncertainty about their values. They are also communication tools, used to inform members of one's own, and other, communities about one's values. Importantly, Discourse models are Bthrough and through, political^ (Gee 1999, 84) . They B'pro-ject' onto that world, from where we 'stand' (where we are socially positioned), certain viewpoints about what is right and wrong, and what can or cannot be done to solve problems in the world^(88).
Given the power of Discourse models to shape debates, policy, and practice, we set out to explore the proposition that people on either side of the conflict of interest Focused Discourse are political actors who are committed to different-and competing-COI Discourse models.
Methods
Meta-Narrative Review
There is no predefined method for analysing Discourse Models. We therefore drew on the methodology of meta-narrative review (henceforth MNR) outlined by Greenhalgh et al. (2005) to conduct our analysis. This is a method that seeks to provide a systematic methodology for literature reviews of topics that span multiple disciplines. It is premised on the idea that much of what we aim to understand as academic researchers or policymakers transcends the traditional disciplinary boundaries of academic inquiry. Conflict of interest is a prime example of this.
Modifying the Meta-Narrative Review Method
Greenhalgh et al.'s MNR approach is based on Kuhn's theory of Bnormal science,^which states that science usually adheres to a set of rules, standards, and norms (a Bparadigm^) that are taken for granted by those working within a given research tradition. This version of MNR thus entails identifying the key research traditions that might have something to say about a particular issue and then examining their paradigmatic narratives (Greenhalgh et al. 2005) . In analysing the COI Discourse, we found that we needed to modify the standard MNR approach because many of those commenting on COI in health and medicine were not doing so from within a particular research tradition. While there have been empirical (quantitative and qualitative), normative ethical, and other theoretical research articles written about COI by scholars working in disciplines such as bioethics, philosophy, sociology, communication studies, health promotion, behavioural economics, and organizational studies, far more frequent and equally influential COI narratives are also being constructed by practicing clinicians, biomedical researchers, biomedical journal editors, policymakers, journalists, health advocates, and consumers, in the form of editorials, opinion pieces, news articles, blogs, and investigative reports. The Kuhnian base for MNR could not help us analyse narratives that weren't easily attributable to a research paradigm and that were being constructed and communicated in arenas outside of formal empirical or theoretical scholarship. In light of these considerations, and the fact that we were more interested in eliciting the breadth of narrative than teasing out specific interdisciplinary differences, we adopted a Bmodified MNR^approach, taking a Bpragmatic^approach to data collection-an approach consistent with the pragmatism espoused by Greenhalgh et al. in 
Research Phases
Our method consisted of five phases-a planning phase, search phase, mapping phase, synthesis phase, and a discussion and conclusion phase. During the planning phase, we assembled a multidisciplinary research team with expertise in bioethics, philosophy, political science, sociology, drug development, medicine, and biomedical research, and defined our open-ended research question: How do actors construct accounts of conflict of interest in health and biomedicine, and what Discourse Models do these accounts create? We also planned our outputs (including this article) and set up a process for peer review.
In our search phase, we began with an examination of key academic databases (PubMed, Scopus, Ovid: Medline and Embase, Web of Science, Google Scholar, Muse, Proquest, and OneSearch). We used the keywords Bconflict of interest,^Bconflict of commitment,^and Btension of obligations.^We identified other academic and grey literature resources by examining the reference lists of identified documents, hand searching key journals, and identifying resources linked to existing networks, relevant organizations, and events such as news stories or conferences. Resources that we considered included scholarly journal articles (including empirical-quantitative and qualitative-research articles, theoretical scholarship-normative and theoretical analyses, letters, editorials, and opinion pieces), books, documentaries, news articles, blogs, and satirical commentaries. We did not place a date limit on our search, the formal phase of which was completed on April 15, 2015. Grey literature and secondary sources were incorporated until the end of November 2015.
i. Inclusion and exclusion criteria The titles and abstracts of all articles were analysed for relevance. We considered any article that discussed conflict of interest, however this was defined. We excluded sources that that were unrelated, or not analogous, to COI in public health or biomedicine. Due to resource constraints, we excluded sources that were not in English or that could not be obtained via University institutional access. For the purpose of this paper, we also ultimately narrowed our focus to resources that specifically discussed financial COI. Because we were interested in identifying the full breadth of narratives related to financial COI, and because many of our sources were not formal research articles, we did not exclude or analyse sources on the basis of research quality or include a formal Bappraisal^phase as part of the MNR.
ii. Search results 2,317 documents were identified through our database searches. The results then were narrowed to 549 relevant documents. An additional seventeen resources were found in the grey literature, including a documentary, a satire, and a chain of email correspondence (all references available upon request).
iii. Thematic saturation In keeping with the principles of qualitative inquiry, data collection and analysis occurred concurrently. Given the large (and ever-growing) number of potential data sources, we ceased collection once we had achieved thematic saturation-i.e. when it became clear that no new narrative elements were emerging from our data. This occurred after approximately fifty of the 566 potentially relevant documents had been analysed. We then analysed fortyseven more documents to ensure that thematic saturation had in fact been reached (see Table 1 ). Where possible, we analysed highly cited sources, as these were likely to represent what Greenhalgh et al. (2005) refer to as Bseminal sources^for metanarrative review (421). They are also likely to be Biconic texts^ (Gee 1999; Little and Lipworth 2007) within the COI Discourse-that is, texts that have extensive influence over Discourse models. In total, we analysed seventeen qualitative resources, four quantitative resources, fifty-six non-empirical resources, and twenty non-academic resources (see Table 1 : Resource List, in Supplementary Material-available online).
During our mapping phase, we sought to identify, for each account of COI, (a) the key actors (who was constructing the Discourse Model and about whom they were speaking), (b) how they chose to approach COI (empirical research, analysis of scandal, ethical analysis, etc.), (c) how they conceptualized COI, including its causes, consequences, and management, and (d) the prevailing language and imagery they used to Btell the story.^Over the course of the mapping phase, exploration of these questions led to further literature searching and iterative refinement of the elements of Discourse Models we had already identified. One researcher [SP] undertook the majority of this task, using regular peer review with team members to examine emerging Discourse Models.
In the synthesis phase we constructed an analytic framework that focused in on two opposing Discourse Models: a BCritical Discourse Model^and a BDefensive Discourse Model.^In keeping with the principles of MNR, we did not attempt to adjudicate between the two Discourse Models. In the final, discussion and conclusion phase we reflected as a research group on our findings and their potential theoretical and practical implications and presented these reflections to our departmental colleagues.
Results
The literature we reviewed could be divided into two broad Discourse models (1) a BCritical Discourse Model,^whose proponents framed COI as a serious problem to be solved, and (2) a BDefensive Discourse Model,^whose advocates reacted to the Critical Discourse Model either because they did not consider COI to be a problem or because they characterized the Critical Discourse Model as a problem in itself. In doing so, they presented an alternative Discourse model of relationships between medical professionals and healthrelated industries. While some authors acknowledged other potential models, and tried to give some semblance of a balanced approach, we did not come across authors who Bsat on the fence^and all accounts could be easily slotted into either the Critical or Defensive Discourse model.
We found that each Discourse model could be broken down into five segments that, taken together, formed an over-arching Discourse model. This finding is consistent with Gee's idea that
iscourse models are complexly, though flexibly organized. There are smaller models inside bigger ones … And we can talk about Bmaster models,^that is sets of associated Discourse models, or single models, that help shape and organize large and important aspects of experience for particular groups of people, as well as … (their) Conversations. (Gee 1999, 83) We also found that some of our sources focused on only one segment, while others articulated more than one. This finding is consistent with Gee's idea that, while Discourse models Bserve as explanations of a given phenomenon, they need not be complete, fullyformed, or consistent^ (Gee 1999, 85) . Overall, each Discourse model took the form a master storyline that told (or challenged) the story of how COIs come into existence and come to be a problem. Each Segment represented one narrative segment of the overall master storyline.
The Critical Discourse Model
The Discourse model that we refer to as the Critical Discourse Model was the dominant Discourse model in the literature we reviewed. Members of the Discourse community espousing this Discourse model represented all stakeholder groups, including highly rigorous scholars in various disciplines, policymakers, passing commenters, journalists, physicians with industry ties, and whistle-blowers.
Segment 1: There has been widespread commercialization of healthcare and biomedical research, driven mainly by the pharmaceutical industry Discourse community members focusing on this segment of the Critical Discourse Model emphasized both the extent of the commercialization of biomedicine and the way that this has been driven by industry. In constructing this part of the Discourse Model, Discourse community members primarily made use of case studies of industry encroachment into medicine, as well as quantitative and qualitative evidence that medical professionals have many and varied financial ties to healthrelated industries.
Many of the most highly cited scholarly works that we reviewed focused on this Segment of the Critical Discourse Model, including Lemmens's (2004) analysis of the BPaxil^lawsuit (a lawsuit about the efficacy and safety of an antidepressant), in which the Attorney General of New York accused Glaxo-Smith Kline (the makers of Paxil) of Brepeated and persistent fraud by misrepresentation, concealing and otherwise failing to disclose to physicians information in its control concerning the safety and effectiveness of [paxil]( 641). This lawsuit was portrayed as being indicative of the predatory corporate culture that had begun to flourish in the United States following the passage of the Bayh-Dole ACT of 1980 (Lemmens 2004) . The Act allowed U.S. researchers and universities to obtain private patents on products resulting from federally-funded research. While researchers were increasingly being edged toward patentable research, corporate drug developers were seeing record profits. As Lemmens argued, BWith profits … have come power, and the incentive to influence the market^(644).
Other sources we reviewed attempted to quantify relationships between industry and medical professions or to understand the reasons for these relationships. For example, in Bekelman et al.'s (2003) systematic review of the scope and impact of financial COI in biomedical research, they found considerable entanglement between industry, researchers, and academic institutions. In their qualitative study of COI among specialist physicians, Doran et al. (2006) reported that specialists attribute their relationships with industry to Bthe imperatives of the market, the need for continuing medical education, (and) limited sources of support available for education, maintenance of professional expertise and ethics^(1512).
Segment 2: Ties to the pharmaceutical industry unconsciously, and therefore unavoidably, influence medical professionals Discourse community members focusing on this segment of the Critical Discourse Model drew attention to a social psychological Bcausal link^in the overall COI master storyline. They did this by presenting, or making reference to, psychological studies showing that people are unavoidably influenced by relationships-particularly those that involve exchanges of value (including small gifts)-and that reasoning and decision-making are as much emotional and intuitive as they are Brational.Î n their account of COI in clinical practice, Dana and Loewenstein (2003) explained how self-interest affects decision-making. Such influence, they argued, is (1) unintentional-individuals are unable to remain objective even when they try to stay impartial, (2) unconscious-even when instructed about it, individuals deny and succumb to it, and (3) indirect-bias may affect the way that individuals seek out and weigh information that affects later decisions.
Similarly, in their account of COI among physicians, Brennan et al. (2006) argued that:
Psychologists, sociologists, and economists have explored human behaviour in a conflicted situation using innovative experimental techniques. Their research has established that behaviour is not entirely rational, individuals are not always conscious of their motives, and many popular beliefs about how individuals act in light of specific information are 'simply wrong.' (430-431).
Segment 3: Individuals and organizations can be Bcorrupted^by their interactions with the pharmaceutical industry Discourse community members focusing on this aspect of the Critical Discourse Model gave the boldest account of COI, with a focus on the corruption of those who engage with industry. Corruption was sometimes framed as a feature of individuals who were well aware of the social obligations that they had undertaken when they joined their profession or organization but had chosen to purposefully misuse their social privileges in order to accrue material benefits, money, rank, reputation, promotion, or power. At other times, corruption was framed as a feature not of individuals but rather of organizations whose commitment to their values has become degraded over time. This phenomenon was sometimes referred to as Binstitutional corruptionâ nd was seen to stem largely from inappropriate dependency of health care organizations on industry (Rodwin 2012) . This segment of the master storyline was also seen to set up a kind of self-reinforcing feedback loop, with corruption automatically creating an environment in which further corruption (purposeful or unguided) is more likely to occur. Discourse community members who focused on this segment most commonly made reference to particular corruption scandals or took advantage of a zeitgeist of distrust in corporations.
In What Pushes Scientists to Lie? The Disturbing but Familiar Story of Haruko Obokata, Rasko and Power (2014) leveraged emotional quotes in building a narrative of both individual and institutional corruption. Their aim was to tell the personal story of scientists who went from being portrayed as angels to demons in the public eye in the wake of research misconduct scandals. They painted a picture of one particular young scientist, Haruko Obokata, catapulted to fame in the wake of an impossible promise of scientific innovation (the creation of Stimulus-Triggered Acquisition of Pluripotency [STAP] cells), given extensive funding and resources, and thereby facing unrealistic pressure to deliver. Rasko and Power suggested that Obokata may have been a scapegoat for a corrupt organization, jockeying for media attention and market dominance in a corrupt industry. It is noteworthy how Rasko and Power appealed to drama and emotion in the telling of their story (see Box 1).
Box 1 Excerpt from the Rasko and C. Power (2014) account of COI One of those singled out for criticism was Yoshiki Sasai, deputy director of Riken and Obokata's supervisor. A well-respected stem cell scientist, Sasai was, in his own words, Boverwhelmed with shame.^In early August, after a month in hospital for depression, the 52-year-old committed suicide in a stairwell at a research facility […] , leaving behind three farewell notes. The one he addressed to Obokata contained this plea: BBe sure to reproduce Stap cells.^ (1) The 2015 film BBought^(2015) told the story of governments corrupted by ties to the vaccine, pharmaceutical, and agricultural Industries (as illustrated in Figure 1 , which is used repeatedly in the film). BBought,^which dubbed itself Bthe most important documentary you've ever seen,^expressed an account of COI at its simplest. That is, as a direct juxtaposition between a particular harm (e.g. an autistic child) and a deeply corrupt or corrupted agent that is responsible for that harm (e.g. a simple statement of the amount that the vaccine industry profits in a year). Evidence to support this view was largely omitted.
Segment 4: COIs lead medical professionals to change their behaviour in specific ways Discourse community members focusing on this segment of the Critical Discourse Model attempted to demonstrate evidence of the behavioural outcomes of interactions with industry. In these accounts, evidence of behaviour change was often seen to be evidence of the existence of causal COIs.
In a highly cited article, Friedberg et al. (1999) reported the findings of a study examining the association between pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and economic assessments of new oncology drugs. They concluded that pharmaceutical company sponsorship of economic analyses is associated with reduced likelihood of reporting unfavourable results. The authors acknowledged that there are many possible reasons for these findings, including strategic decisions made by pharmaceutical companies to fund only analyses that are likely to be favourable. They did, however, link the finding to COIs on the part of academic researchers, and hypothesized that the findings may at least partly stem from academic researchers' Bunconscious bias (perhaps when qualitatively interpreting results) that could influence study conclusions^ (1999, 1456) .
Later, Robertson et al. (2012) reviewed evidence of the impact of financial relationships on physicians (among other healthcare providers). They reported that financial incentives and drug samples lead to changes in both physician perceptions of medical technologies and behaviour change: Direct financial inducements led to pharmaceutical promotion, provision of free samples influenced physician prescribing behaviour, and device marketing affected physician's perceptions of drugs.
Segment 5: COIs lead to harms to patients, research participants, and health systems Many Discourse community members who engaged with the Critical Discourse Model focused on harms as an outcome of COIs. They described potential, perceived, or actual harms to patients, research participants, the public, the professions, and even industry itself. These harms included material damage (e.g. patients and research participants experiencing unnecessary side effects of treatments or health services being burdened with unnecessarily expensive treatments) as well as less tangible harms such as loss of trust and credibility. As with Segment 4, this segment of the overall Critical Discourse Model often led to Bbackwards^speculation that the presence of problematic COIs are the cause of the harms that were being observed. In other words, the existence of a problematic COI was seen as a foregone conclusion when examining a given harm. Abramson and Starfield (2005) focused their attention on the harms associated with poorly constructed clinical practice guidelines. They examined the case of the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) Vioxx, noting that, until Vioxx was withdrawn from the market due to its risk to patients, the American College of Rheumatology guidelines for treatment of osteoarthritis of the hip and knee, had given a privileged place to its class of drugs (COX-2 inhibitors) for patients with osteoarthritis. This was despite the fact that it had not been shown that COX-2 inhibitors were more effective or safer than older NSAIDs. In fact, the heavily promoted gastrointestinal benefits of Vioxx were already known to be outweighed by the increased cardiovascular risks to patients. The authors deduced that the only apparent explanation for this non-concordance between evidence and guidelines lay in knowing that all four of its authors had financial ties to the manufacturers of Vioxx or other similar agents. Accordingly, Abramson and Starfield (2005) asserted that the Vioxx case showed that clinical practice guidelines may inappropriately reflect the interest of industry over the interest of citizens and public health. Susan Okie (2001) , told a similar story in her Washington Post exposé of Celebrex (an NSAID like Vioxx). In this case the problem was seen to be the selective publication of trial data (which obscured the gastrointestinal side-effects of Celebrex) and the negative effects that exposure of the deceit had on credibility and perceived trustworthiness of the experts who had initially endorsed the drug. Okie's story highlighted the different ways in which responsibility had been assigned, noting denial of personal responsibility on the part of the academic authors of the study, the editors of the journal that published the study, and the pharmaceutical company involved.
The Defensive Discourse Model
A growing proportion of the COI Focused Discourse represents what might be called a Defensive Discourse Model, which both Bbreaks apart^each segment of the Critical Discourse Model and constructs an alternative model of the relationships between medicine and healthrelated industry. The members of the Discourse community espousing this Discourse model were mainly physicians, researchers, and public relations representatives with industry ties. Rather than presenting empirical evidence, case studies, or qualitative inquiries, members of this Discourse community tended to present counterarguments and criticisms of evidence presented in the Critical Discourse Model, primarily in the form of defensive opinion pieces. As with the Critical Discourse Model, the Defensive master storyline was made up of five segments.
Segment 1: There has been widespread commercialization of healthcare and biomedical research, but this has been driven by both the pharmaceutical industry and the genuine needs of patients and medical professionals Discourse community members focusing on this segment of the Defensive Discourse Model agreed that health-related industries have had a major impact on health and biomedicine. But they viewed this change as both necessary and something that has long been encouraged not only by industry but also by medical professionals and consumers (i.e. it has not been predatory on the part of industry or passive on the part others). They also argued that the majority of interactions between medicine and industry now just Bhappen,^largely unnoticed, because they are part-and-parcel of medicine as we know and want it. Kingdom (2013) presented the transition to industry-funded medical research as the only reasonable option in modern healthcare systems. Given that public funding for research requires tax money and charitable organizations require donations, she concluded that B[n]one of the alternatives are viable or acceptable and the pharmaceutical industry continues to thrive^(1). Corboy (2014) offered a similar perspective, arguing that dependence on commerce is too difficult (if not impossible) to reverse given that government and other not-for-profit entities would have trouble filling the research vacuum left by pharmaceutical companies and Bno research = no progress^(162).
Those putting forward this segment of the Defensive Discourse Model were critical of the way in which industry is portrayed in the Critical Discourse Model. Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, Lisa Rosenbaum (2015b), for example, pointed out that the Critical Discourse Model is often deliberately constructed to be compelling through the imagery it constructs about the place of industry in health and medicine (Box 2).
Box 2 Excerpt from Rosenbaum (2015b) account
We see the attractive pharmaceutical reps in our offices. We eat the lunches (or walk away hungry). Our patients, heeding the 'Ask your doctor' mantra of drug ads, request medications we may not believe should be prescribed. We hear that our prescription habits are being monitored so that we can be targeted for better sales. And we observe colleagues, their suits sharp, their skin tanned from a free Hawaiian vacation, their children's college education covered … By contrast, how visible to us are physician-scientists whose National Institutes of Health grant applications go unfunded, and who therefore increasingly rely on industry support for their laboratories? Does it cross our minds, when we prescribe statins after a myocardial infarction, how much collaboration between industry and physician-scientists was required to develop them? (1863) Segment 2: Ties to the pharmaceutical industry may influence individuals but these influences can be made conscious and managed Discourse community members focusing on this part of the Defensive Discourse Model did not deny the potential power of unconscious and emotion-driven reasoning. However, they argued that these forces can be managed. As Rosenbaum noted:
By definition, a conflict of interest represents a risk that judgment will be compromised-not a determination that such a lapse has actually occurred-the pharmascolds' narrative about conflicts of interest often conflates the two. (2015c, 1960) Taking a somewhat different tack, some members of this Discourse community also downplayed the psychological significance of industry interactions by challenging the idea that there is anything unique about the psychological effects of relationships with the pharmaceutical industry. Rosenbaum, for example, argued that: B[y]ou can't exactly randomly assign some physicians to being motivated by the pursuit of tenure, others by ideology, others by the possibility of future stock returns, and others by just wanting to be really good doctors^ (2015c, 1961) . Citrome et al. (2014) and Kingdom (2013) went a step further, arguing that to say that those with pharmaceutical industry relationships are more likely to be influenced than people who interact with other industries is a form of prejudice and discrimination. They coined the term Pharmaism to refer to: Bthe belief that people associated with pharmaceutical companies are more likely to be intellectually and morally dishonest than others^ (Citrome et al. 2014, 659) . They also portrayed authors of the corresponding Critical Discourse Model as unreasonable and as themselves falling victim to Bcognitive distortions^(659).
Segment 3: Medical professionals can maintain their moral integrity when they interact with health-related industries In addressing Segment 3 of the Critical Discourse Model, Discourse community members focused on the moral integrity of the majority of industry collaborators. Some of them shared personal experiences of those who engage with industry, yet strive to maintain balance and manage influence. They complained about the fact that, regardless of their true motives, their peers often react to these individuals with derision and label them as Bcorrupt.^Rosenbaum (2015b) for example expressed concern that:
The enduring influence of … [COI] stories may be emotional rather than cognitive. No one worries about industry interacting with physicians: we worry about Bcorrupt industry^interacting with Bcorruptible physicians. ^(2015b, 1863) Their concern was that industry collaborators have been found guilty in the court of public opinion, the presumption of innocence is gone, and the due diligence of identifying and proving causal linkages in assigning blame has gone with it. Kingdom (2013) called this Bstereotyping,^Bsport,^and Btarget practice,^while Citrome et al. (2014) called it Bprejudice or discrimination^and viewed it as another manifestation of Pharmaism.
Taking this further, some asserted that this culture of suspicion is itself immoral, given its tendency to cast industry collaborators as corrupt. Proponents of the Defensive Discourse Model cast themselves as the proverbial Davids and those critical of COI as Goliaths. Rosenbaum called out the Bpharmascolds^for Bstifling of honest discourse^and praised authors like Shaywitz and Stossel for being Brare voices competing with a loud chorus of shaming^ (2015c, 1960) .
Segment 4: Interactions with industry may affect the behaviour of medical professionals, but behaviour change isn't necessarily bad Discourse community members focusing on this segment of the Defensive Discourse Model acknowledged that professional behaviour is affected by industry interactions (as per Segment 4 of the Critical Discourse Model) but questioned whether there is anything unique about financial ties in this regard. Rosenbaum, for example, posed the question: BWhen we study whether people with financial ties are more likely to vote in favor of a product, shouldn't we also ask whether those without such ties are more likely to vote against it?^(2015c, 1962).
Segment 5: Industry interactions are beneficial to patients, research participants, and health systems Finally, members of the Discourse community espousing the Defensive Discourse Model argued that interactions with industry and resulting changes in behaviour are largely beneficial to patients, research participants, and health systems. Barton, Stossel, and Stell (2014) , for example, asked us to consider marketing to physicians as a way of increasing the number of patients who are treated with effective therapies. They argue that providing more information to physicians Braises awareness^of new products and aid in their clinical decision-making, thereby reducing the number of patients that go untreated for conditions for which the drug is advertised. Corboy (2014) focused his efforts on articulating the potential benefits to society and to patients from physician-pharma relationships, while Rosenbaum (2015b) argued that:
Although most observers agree that we must mitigate the risk of bias introduced by these relationships, the benefits wrought by interactions between physician-scientists and industry at the basic or translational research level are equally clear. (2015b, 1860-1861) Kingdom went further, calling the pharmaceutical industry a Bsuccess story, creating employment, contributing to gross domestic product, and developing new treatments for disease^(1-2).
In a typical structure of offering counter-arguments and then redirecting the blame back at the Critical Discourse Model, members of the defensive Discourse community asserted that extreme efforts to mitigate financial interests and curb their behavioural effects are themselves harmful, restrictive, and burdensome. Citrome et al. (2014) cautioned that Bstrong antipharma biases in the form of pharmaism actually can be harmful to patient care, drug discovery and development, clinical research, resident training, physician education, and innovation^(659) and that academia's Bself-imposed^isolation has had a deleterious effect: BUnless academia can re-engage with industry in open, ethical relationships, patient care will continue to suffer from a lack of knowledge and innovation^(660).
Perceived harms associated with attempts to control COI included not only material harm but also loss of trust. Rosenbaum, for example, concluded that: BAs the public observes this spiral of blame and shame, the conflict-of-interest movement has paradoxically achieved what it set out to avert: an erosion of public trust in medicine and science^( 2015a, 2067). Citrome et al. (2014) partially defined Pharmasim as Bdiscrediting health care providers because of their association with a pharmaceutical company^(659). Kingdom (2013) drew an analogy to the effects on trust of negative press around the banking industry. In addressing her editorial to the employees of industry, Kingdom not only attempted to abdicate them from any feeling of responsibility for COI but also to rouse feelings solidarity and pride and engender distrust or wariness of those advancing the Critical Master Narrative (Box 3).
Box 3 Excerpt from Kingdom (2013) Most of us who do our work in or for the pharmaceutical industry do our work diligently, honestly, and responsibly. We take pride in our work, we take the regulations seriously, and we work to high ethical standards because we believe that it is the right thing to do […] 
Discussion
Summary and Interpretation
It is clear that there are two distinctly different Discourse communities coming into conflict in debates about COI, each of which has its own Discourse Model that constructs a particular master storyline of COI. The two communities agree that commercialization is a major force in contemporary science and medicine and that its influence can be both corruptive and beneficial. They disagree, however, about whether industry influence is, overall, a benign or malignant societal force and whether it needs to be embraced or Bmanaged.^Members of the Discourse community espousing the Critical Discourse Model frame COI in health and medicine as something that is deliberately-and calculatingly-created by industry, in collaboration with scientists and healthcare professionals who are seen to be at best naïve and passive and at worst individually or institutionally corrupt. According to this Discourse Model, interactions with industry unavoidably change professional attitudes and behaviour in a manner that is harmful to patients, health systems, and the scientific endeavour. In contrast, members of the Discourse community putting forth the Defensive Discourse Model see industry influence as a force that is motivated by unmet medical need and that is able to meet this need through the actions of wise and well-intentioned medical professionals who can manage any COIs that may arise.
It is evident from this deconstruction that the two Discourse communities have profoundly different views about markets and their contribution to security and flourishing. Members of the Critical Discourse community appear to be highly sceptical about the norms of capitalism, while members of the Defensive Discourse community appear to be accepting of these norms and of the idea that the Binvisible hand^of the free market will regulate pernicious industry practices and fairly distribute benefits throughout society. The two groups also differ considerably in terms of how they think that market-related harms (to the extent that they exist) should be understood and managed. The Critical Discourse Model is essentially Bprudential,^in that it construes episodes of proven harm as evidence of ongoing danger-a danger that needs to be actively managed along the whole causal chain by limiting commercialization, eliminating commercial interest, and governing practice by legislation, protocols, and guidelines. The Defensive Discourse Model, in contrast, is Bpragmaticb ecause it claims that the circumstances that enable COI are simply a natural reflection of widely accepted, and largely acceptable, socio-political norms. While they acknowledge that harms can occur, they do not see much scope (or need) for societal change or professional regulation because they believe that the market will ultimately reject practices and activities deemed unacceptable by consumers. They also believe that individuals can manage COIs by way of their own consciences and the consciences of those around them.
Implications For Academic COI Debates and Policymaking
Beyond elucidating the competing values underpinning debates about conflict of interest and its management, our analysis of Discourse models can help us to understand why debates about COI have become so intractable. First, Discourse models reflect our views about how the world works and how to survive, be secure, and flourish within it. As such, they are held onto tightly and defended passionately when challenged. Those espousing the Critical Discourse Model are therefore likely to genuinely believe that society is endangered by market forces, while those promoting the Defensive Discourse Model likely believe that markets, left to their own devices, are the best (or at least the least-worst) route to survival, security, and flourishing.
A second reason that debates about COI are so intractable is because Discourse Models are underpinned by taken-for-granted worldviews (master storylines) and do not necessarily rely on evidence to be upheld. This is not to say that debates about COI are evidence-freemembers of the Critical Discourse community in particular have produced copious amounts of evidence to support their position. In this regard, they have an advantage over members of the Defensive Discourse community because, as a general principle, it is easier to produce evidence demonstrating a system's shortcomings than it is to demonstrate that it is working (how many people benefitted from Vioxx for example?). Thus while industry critics can produce statistics and powerful anecdotes to support their views, the pragmatists must use moral arguments and persuasion to justify the status quo. Despite this advantage, the evidence produced by members of the Critical Discourse community is largely downplayed or ignored by those members of the Defensive Discourse community. The latter group is able to Bget away^with this ignoring or downplaying of evidence because, in the real world of medical practice and healthcare, the Defensive Discourse Model has real purchase. While obviously seeking to avoid Vioxx-like disasters, medical professionals generally accept that they work within a capitalist society and want to practise their profession using all available means. No amount of evidence is likely to convince them otherwise.
A third, related, reason that debates about COI are so intractable is that, even if there was greater agreement that change is needed, such efforts would collide with a number of extremely strong societal forces. Pharmaceutical companies are immensely successful, wealthy, and powerful. They succeed in the market place, offer employment, and exemplify the virtues of employment and growth. Their product is widely accepted as an essential part of modern healthcare. The measures that would be needed to rein in its power-such as far greater government control over drug development, research, and marketing-would demand a dismantling of significant relationships of power and responsibility that inhere in a capitalist society and would almost certainly be rejected by a large number of people within the current sociopolitical context. This is not to deny the potential importance of ongoing efforts in this regard, but largescale efforts will be needed in order to precipitate any real change.
While debates about COI are unlikely to ever be completely resolved, ongoing discourse should nonetheless be encouraged. This discourse should, ideally, take the form of a dialectic, aiming not for a simple resolution but rather for a richer Btruth^(or Bsynthesis^) that accommodates complexity and adapts to change (Westphal 2005) . To begin to move towards a dialectical synthesis, those engaged in debates about COI might do well to ask themselves questions such as: 1) Which Discourse model (or segment thereof) is shaping my opinions and preferences? 2) Which Discourse model (or segment thereof) is shaping my opponents' opinions and preferences? 3) Are we Btalking past^each other (e.g. by responding to a statement about the degree of dependence on industry with a statement about the harmful consequences of a particular COI)? And, 4) Can more be done to acknowledge common ground and/or the potential validity of competing Discourse models?
Health policymakers could adopt a similar approach before attempting to institute any particular management strategy (e.g. proscription of particular behaviours or public disclosure of interactions between medical professionals and the pharmaceutical industry). They could, for example, ask themselves: 1) Which Discourse model (or segment thereof) is shaping the policy approach I am advocating? 2) Which Discourse model (or segment thereof) is shaping the opinions and preferences of those who are opposing this particular policy strategy? And, 3) Can more be done to acknowledge common ground and/or the potential validity of different policy approaches?
Limitations and Future Research
There are several caveats that need to be considered when conducting and interpreting a meta-narrative review (MNR). First, MNR is descriptive and does not allow one meta-narrative to be judged relative to another even though not all narratives may be equally well told, grounded in actual events, or supportable. We cannot, therefore, argue for superiority of either the Critical Discourse Model or the defensive alternative on the basis of our analysis. Second, the MNR approach, with its focus on differences, can obscure similarities between accounts and unduly force or inflate disagreements. We might, therefore, have missed some of the subtler points of agreement between those espousing the two Discourse models. Similarly, because the MNR approach seeks out stories that are constructed largely for political purposes, it might not identify more complex stories that occur Bbehind the scenes.^All of these limitations associated with MNR were mitigated to the best of our ability by our efforts to conduct a thorough and systematic literature review of both academic and grey literatures and to select a diverse research team and engage in regular peer review.
This research focused on financial COIs, and on relationships between medical professionals and the pharmaceutical industry. In future research, the Discourse models associated with non-financial COIs (e.g. COIs related to interpersonal relationships and professional prestige) could be examined and compared to those associated with financial COIs. Systematic comparisons could also be drawn between Discourse models of pharmaceutical industry-related COIs and COIs related to government funders and other health-related industries such as medical devices, mobile health, biotechnology, and food and beverage industries. Finally, it would be important to explore the Discourse models associated with COIs that arise in practices other than clinical medicine and research, such as biomedical publication, health journalism, and health policymaking.
Conclusion
It is clear from our analysis that those engaging in COI discourse have become entrenched in either critical or defensive positions. Our analysis of debates about COI suggest that while there might be some scope for progress in debates about COI, the fact that these debates are underpinned by such profoundly differing views about security and flourishing and the fact that market capitalism is so deeply entrenched in contemporary society, means it is unlikely that debates about COI will ever be conclusively Bresolved.^The current active debate between the two sides in the COI debate may eventually produce a dialectical synthesis, and it is certainly worth aiming for this, but the kinds of arguments that dominate the present literature suggest that we are a long way from that desirable moment.
